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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
PACIFIC COAS'T TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
HARTFORD AC'CIDENT &
- INDEMNITY COMPANY
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 8719

BRIEF OF PACIFIC COAST TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY, RE·SPONDEN:T
STATEMENT OF FACT'S
Respondent, Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company, adopts generally Appellant's .statement of
facts, but must add certain matters omitted. This
case was consolidated for trial with two other cases
likewise involving suits against Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Company and all arising out of the
same Contract Bond (Ex. Pr-1) which reads as follows, (Appellant quoted only certain portions):
"KNOW ALL MEN BY THE'SE PRESENTS:
1
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That We, CASSADY COMPANY, Inc.,
a Utah corporation, and C. P. CASSADY of
Arcadia, California, (hereinafter called the
PRINICIPAL) and HARTFORD ACCIDENT
AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, a corporation, with its principal office in Hartford,
Connecticut, and authorized to transact surety business in the State of Utah, (hereinafter
called the SUREITY) are held and firmly
'bound and obligated unto PRUDENTIAL
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation of the United States
of America, (hereinafter called LENDER
OBLIGEE) and unto FELT SYNDICATE,
a corporation of the State of Utah, (hereinafter called the OWNER OBLIGEE), and
unto PACIFIC COAST TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation of the State of
Utah (hereinafter called TITLE OBLIGEE),
as their respective interests may appear as
obligees in the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED
SIXTY THREE THOUSAND AND N'0/100
( $76'3,000.00) DOLLARS lawful money of
the United States of America, for the payment
of which PRIN'CIPAL AND SURETY bind
themselves, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents.
WHEREAS, the PRINCIPAL has entered into a contract with the OWNER OBLIGEE for the construction of dwelling
houses and appurtenant improvements in a
housing project known and designated as
Morningside Heights Subdivision, located in
Salt Lake County, Utah, which contract is by
reference incorporated herein an.d made a part
hereof; and
2
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WHEREAS, the LENDER OBLIGEE
has agreed to lend to each qualified borrower,
upon the security of a first lien mortgage, a
sum of money to be used in the construction
of a dwelling house and appurtenant improvements upon a lot in said housing project owned by the borrower; and
WHEREA~s, the funds loaned by the
LENDER OBLIGEE on the security of said
first lien mortgage will be used with the con·sent of the borrower in making payments due
the PRINCIPAL under said contract; and
WHEREAS, the TTTLE OBLIGEE will
issue A:TA title insurance policies on· each lot
or parcel of real estate upon which the LENDER OBLIGEE makes a mortgage toan as
herein stated; and
·
WHEREA·S, the LENDER OBLIGEE,
TITLE OBLIGEE, and OWNER OBLIGEE
each desire protection as their interests may
appear, in event of default by the PRINCIpAL under said contract, said protection to
be subject to the performance by the LENDER OBLIGEE, the TITLE OBLIGEE, and
the OWNER OBLIGEE of their respective
obligations to the PRINCIPAL in connection
with said contract;
NOW, THERE.FORE, the condition of
this obligation is such that if the PRINCIPAL
well and truly performs all the undertakings,
covenants, conditions and agreements·of said
contract on its part and fully indemnifies
and saves harmless the obligees from all loss,
sost, damage, and expense which they may
suffer, either jointly and severally, by reason
of failure so to do, and fully reimburse and
3
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repays obligees all outlay and expense which
said obligees may incur in making good any
such default; and, further, if the PRINCIpAL shall pay all persons who have contracted, or will have contracted, directly with
PRINICIPAL for services or labor or materials- furnished under the provisions of said
contract, and shall keep and maintain each
lot or building-site free and clear of labor and
material liens, then this obligation shall be
void; otherwise, it s'hall remain in full force
and effect.
The foregoing, however, is su·bject to the
following provisions :
1. The LENDER OBLIGEE shall have
prior right and lien under this Bond as against
the other o~bligees herein named.
2. 'The SURE.TY and PRINCIPAL
agree that, in the event the PRINCIPAL shall
default in the performance of the undertakings, covenants, terms, conditions, and agreements of said contract on its part, the SURETY will have the option to cure and remedy
said default and complete performance of said
contract.
3. The SURETY shall not be liable under this Bond to t~e Obligees, and either of
them, unless the Obligees, or either of them,
shall make payment to the PRINCIPAL in
reasonable compliance with the terms of said
contract as to payments, and each shall perform all other obligations to be performed by
each Obligee under said contract at the time
and in the manner therein set forth.
4. !The SURETY agrees that any right
of action or clain1 that either of the Obligees
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

herein might have under this Bond may be
subordinated to the other, and that such subordination will in no manner invalidate or
qualify this Bond. The SURETY further
agrees to recognize any such agreement of
subordination and priority upon being furnished with signed evidence thereof. ·
5. No- suit, action, or proceeding by
of any default, whatever, shall be brought on
this Bond after two ('2) years ·from the date
on which the final payr.aent under the contract falls due, provided, however, that in the
event there exists or is pending any collateral
litigation which has the effect of making it
impossible for any Obligee under this Bond to
determine its rights hereunder, a suit, action,
or other proceeding under this Bond may be
instituted within six (6) months after entry
of final judgment in said collateral litigation.
6. The prior written approval of SURETY shall be required with regard to any
changes or alterations in said contract where
the cost thereof, added to prior changes or
alterations, causes the aggregate cost- of all
changes and alterations to exceed 10 per cent
of the original contract price; but, except as
to the foregoing, any alterations which may
be made in the terms of the contract, or in the
work to 'be done under it, or the giving by the
Obligees of any extensions of time for the
performance of the contract, or any other
forbearance on the part of either the Obligees
or PRINCIPAL to the other, shall not in any
way release SURETY or PRINCIPA,L of the
obligations of this instrument, notice of SURETY of any such alterations, extensions, or
forbearance being hereby waived.
5
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7. The aggregate liability of SURETY
hereunder to the Obligees or their assigns is
limited to the penal sum above stated, and
SURETY, upon making any payment hereunder shall be subrogated to, and shall be entitled to an assignment of, all rights of the
payee, either against PRINCIPAL or against
any other party liable to the payee in connection with the loss which is the su'bject of
the payment.
SIGNED, SEALED AND DATED
21st day of July, 1950.
PREMIUM ON THIS
BOND IS $7,630.00
CAS'SADY COMPANY, INC
By
/s/ C. P. Cassady
/s/ C. P. Cassady
C. P. Cassady .
HAR:TFORD ACCIDENT AND
INDEMNITY COMPANY
By
jsj A. L. Blackburn
A. L. Blackburn,
Attorney-in-Fact''
The reason for this bond was that one hundred
mortgage loans were necessary to finance the Morningside Heights project. Prudential would not loan
the money unless Title Company would insure their
100 mortgages (as yet unexecuted and the mortgagors unknown) as first liens as required by its
correspondent Prudential Insurance Company of
America and the U. S. Veterans Administration.
The Title Company would not insure the mortgages
as first liens, as and when executed, because work
6
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had been started on some of the subdivision lots.
Thus a bond was required where ·not· only the then
ov1ner (Felt) was an obligee but also Prudential
and the Title Company had to be obligees or no
A.T.A. policies of title insurance would have been
issued on the proposed mortgages.
1

The financing program was such that individual loans were to be made to veteran purchasers
of the lots in Morningside Heights an·d until and
when each lot had been sold, a note and mortgage
executed, the proposed veteran-borrower approved
by the lending institution and the U. S. Veterans
Administration, the mortgage actually recorded and
the A-T-A policy of title insurance issued, Prudential had no right or duty to dis·burse any funds. This
same procedure had to be repeated 100 times as such
was a prerequisite to the disbursing of funds on each
and all of the 100 separate loans and all were advisedin advance of such requirements.
Appellant's statement of facts reflects that
problems arose between the Cassadys as contractors,
the suppliers of materials, Felt Syndicate and Prudential throughout the last five months of 1950. In
compromise settlement of such difficulties, the contractor, Cassady, which had agreed to complete all
100 houses within 180 days from July 19, 1950
(Exh. PR-2), sought and received an extension of
time for completion up to June 1, 1951. 'This was
7
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by ''Supplemental Agreement" dated February 16,
1951 (Exh. PR-6).
In partial recognition of delays and the increase of costs and in an apparent effort to compromise the claims made by Cassady as to Felt's
responsibility therefor, this Supplemental Agreement of February 16, 1951 in paragraph I of Article
III -increased the price per house to be paid by Cassady. The parties also confirmed and approved all
disbursements of the funds paid by Prudential to
Associated Accountants and then Felt, Cassady and
Accountants "here·by irrevocably admit that they,
and each of them, have secured from Prudential an
accounting of the proceeds of all mortgage loans and
down payments and the disbursal of same by Prudential to the date hereof." And then they further,
''hereby admit, agree and declare that Prudential
has performed all of its obligations under said Primary Contract and Disbursing Contract and supplement thereto dated the 2'2nd day of August 1950,
from the respective dates thereof to the date of this
Supplement Agreement."
This said document (PR-6) extending the time
of completion, estalblishing new disbursing procedures and discretionary powers in Prudential and
acknowledging the full accounting by Prudential to
date, was then signed by all parties including Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company as Title Obligee
8
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and also by Hartford as the Surety Company.
In this case there was a stipulation of facts
('Title Co. R 11-13) which reads:
"The parties hereto for the purpose of
this proceeding, stipulate that the following
facts may be received and considered by the
Court as fully in the determination of th issues herein along with other testimony as if
such had been testified to directly by competent witnesses at the trial thereof.
1. That plaintiff is a Utah corporation
and at all times mentioned herein was and is
duly licensed to engage in business as a title
insurance company in the State of Utah.
2. That the defendant, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, is an insurance
corporation having its principal office in
Hartford, Connecticut, but is duly licensed
to and is actually engaged in the transaction
of a surety business in the State of Utah.
3. That for the sum of $76'30.00 premium paid to the defendant, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, the defendant
executed and delivered a document designated
as "·Contract Bond" dated July 21, 1950 for
the sum of $763,000.00 in words and figures
as shown by Exhibit No. 1 at Pretrial.
4. ·That plaintiff was a party to said
bond, designated as the "Title O·bligee".
5. 'That said bon·d was issued in conjunction with an agreement for the erection
of one hundred dwelling houses and appurtenant improvements on one hundred lots in a
su'bdivision of Salt Lake County, known and
9
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designated as Morningside Heights Subdivision, whics said agreement is dated July 19,
1950 and designated as pre-trial Exhibit No.
2 and a loan agreement designated as Exhibit No. 7 at pre-trial, dated June 16, 1950.
6. That plaintiff issued A.T.A. policies
of title insurance on each and all of the said
one hundred lots and dwelling houses in
Morningside Heights Subdivision as and when
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association completed a mortgage loan on each of
said lots and plaintiff did show such mortgage as a first lien against the several lots
without any exception for possible material
men's, laborers', or subcontractors' liens
against the property. T·he first policy was issued August 15, 1950 and the last one on
December 8, 1950.
7. !That in fact the claims of material
men, laborers and subcontractors were not
paid by the principal and several lien claims
and amended lien claims were filed against ·
the said one hundred lots in the Morningside
Heights Subdivision and action. was brought
in the District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, Utah to foreclose such lien claims,
being Civil No. 98,351 entitled Welch Planing
Mill, Inc. v. F.elt Syndicate, Inc. et al.
8. ·That plaintiff did not handle the disbursement or distribution of any of the funds
involved in the construction of the premises,
nor received any of the proceeds of the mortgages, except such sums as were paid to it
through its agent, Security Title Company at
Salt Lake City, Utah, for the regular premiums on the insurance of the mortgages referred to above.
10
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9. That on August 2·7, 1953, written
demand was duly made by the Prudential
Federal Savings & Loan Association, as the
mortgagee and holder of the said one hundred mortgages and the A. T .A. policies of title
insurance, that plaintiff defend it and said
n1ortgages against the litigation filed by lien
claimants.
10. That the plaintiff thereupon engaged legal counsel and they appeared .in said
litigation as counsel for Prudential Federal
Savings & Loan Assn. in opposition to the
liens so filed and in all phases thereof from
about May, 1953 to and including October of
1955, and has expended in such defense the
sum of $3600.99 for expenses ~of depositions,
attorneys' fees and court costs, all of which
were reasonably necessary and proper and related to the defense against said material
men's and subcontractors' liens.
11. That the litigation, Civil No. 98351
involved the proposed foreclosure of liens and
amended liens filed by Welch Planing Mill,
Inc., Standard Lumber Company, Garold E.
Jackson, Star Plumbing and Heating Company, Inc., I. A. Thompson, Nu-Way Builders
Supply Company an·d Elias Morris & Sons
Company. Those lien claims and amended lien
claims were compromised and settled the actions dismissed with prejudice on or a:bout
October 5, 1955.
12. 'That the monies paid to the lien
claimants for such compromise settlements
were advanced by Prudential Federal Savings
& Loan Association and by Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Company and such settlement
ll
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was made with a full reservation of all rights
between Felt Syndicate, Inc., Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association and Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. That plaintiff's
counsel participated in arranging said compromise settlement negotiations and signed the
final stipulation therein on behalf of Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association.
13. That no final adjudication was
made as to any of the lien claims because of
the compromise settlement of the litigation.
14. That the litigation relating to the
enforcement of the numerous liens, being
Civil No. 98,351 as referred to above, was
collateral litigation necessary to determine
the extent and nature of the liens and plaintiff's rights under said Contract Bond and
such was not completed until on or about
October 4, 1955.
15. That defendant has refused to reimburse plaintiff for its said expenses and
costs in defending Civil No. 98,351."
The issuance of the A-T-A policies of title insurance required that the property be inspected to
ascertain whether any work had been commenced or
materials delivered on the site prior to recording
the mortgages. The examination of the title and the
inspection of the premises was handled by Surety
Title Company and it then issued a preliminary report to Prudential to show the status of the titles
and the mortgagability. Exh. Pac. 27 is such a preliminary report on the 100 lots. It is dated June 22,
12
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1950 and on page 2 recites as an exception to marketability, "9. The construction of improvements
having been commenced on said property, no liability is assumed as to liens that may be filed in connection with said improvements."
Mr. Mark D. Eggertsen, President of Security
Title Company (agent for Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company) testified that they were requested to write policies of title insurance on the 100
mortgages as first liens granting "full coverage"
but they would not do so normally without putting
in an exception for possible rights of materialmen
and laborers once construction was ·started ahead
of the mortgages. They "would not issue a full
coverage A. T .A. policy unless a bond was furnis·hed"
(Tr. 170) because basements had already been dug.
He then testified that they relied upon the -.bop<:}
from Hartford in issuing the 100 policies on the
Prudential mortgages without any exception for
mechanics liens and materiaJmens liens.
The loss sustained by this plaintiff represented
attorneys fees, travel, depositions and similar costs
and expenses relating to the defense of the priority
of the 100 mortgages from the attack of materialmen who had filed liens against the 100 lots in Morningside Heights Subdivision. Defendant has stipulated as to the amount of said costs and expenses.
No claim is made that Pacific Coast Title Insurance
13
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Company at any time or in any manner breached
its obligations in the transaction or under any contract.
POIN·TS
POINT I
THE FINDINGS AND- JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
PACIFIC COAS'T TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY ARE
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT AND
MATERIAL EVIDENCE.
POINT II
THE BREACH OF THE CONTRACT BY FELT OR
ANY o·THER PARTY, IF ANY, DOES NOT BARRECOVERY BY PACIFIC COAST TITLE INSURANICE
COMPANY.
POINT III
THE PARTIES TO THE PRIMARY CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT AND THE CONTRACT BOND COMPROMISED AND SET'TLED ANY AND ALL PRIOR
CLAIMED CONTRACT BREACHES BY THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMEN-T OF FEBRUARY 16, 1951.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT IS A COMPENSATED SURETY AND
THE CONTRAC'T BOND MUST BE CONSTRUED MOST
STRONGLY AGAINST THE SURETY.
POINT V
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE LAW.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FINDINGS AND JiUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
PACIFIC COAST TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY ARE
SU'PPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, C·OMPETEN'f AND
MATERIAL EVIDENCE.

Appellant seems to take only one approach in
opposing the Title Company's judgment. That is
set fo:_"th in its Point VII wherein it asserts that
the " Title Company did not sustain any compensable damage . . . " 'The last "Whereas" clause of
the bond recites that "the Lender Obligee, Title
Obligee and Owner Obligee each desire protection
as their interests may appear, in the event of default
by the principal under said con tract, . . . '' (underscoring ours) .
1

Then the bond undertakes in the next paragraph to indemnify and save harmless the obligees
"from all loss, cost, damage, and expense which
they may suffer ... " and further ties this obligation to the duty of the Principal (Cassady) to pay
all persons who have contracted for labor or materials "and shall keep and maintain each lot and
building site free and clear of labor and material
.
11ens
. . .''.
The stipulation of facts set forth above in this
case shows the filing of liens on the one hundred
lots, the filing of a case, Civil No. 98,351 to fore15
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close the liens, the demand by Prudential that the
Title Company defend the first lien of the mortgage
against the lien claims; and the expenditure of
$3600.99 by the Title Company was "for expenses
of depositions, attor11eys fees and court costs, all
of which were reasonably necessary and proper and
related to the defense against said materialr.aen's
and subcontractors' liens.''
Can it be said that these costs of depositions,
attorneys fees and court costs were not within the
contemplation of the parties? These are the very
things for which the Title Company sought, in part,
protection by means of the bond. The filing of materialmen's liens and the necessity of defending the
mortgages against the same or paying such were
real threats in light of the fact that construction
had been started on the project well in advance of
the recording of any of the 100 mortgages. This was
not a vague imagination as the record shows that
work had been started by way of basement excavations prior to the Title Company's preliminary report on June 22, 1950 while the basic contract between Felt & Cassady was not executed until July
19, 1951 and the Contract Bond guaranteeing its
performance was not signed until July 21, 1951.
Appellant has cited a few cases in which a decision has stated that attorneys fees are not recoverable unless a specific contractual provision so pro16
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vides. We feel that such cases are not in point under
the type of bond here involved. This compensated
surety, Hartford, has agreed to pay "allloss,es, cost,
damage, and expense."
Appellant's leading case is D,ahl v. Princ,e, 119
Ut 556, 230 Pac. ( 2d) 328. This was a claim and
delivery action for a Buick automobile in which the
trial court found for the plaintiff and tacked on attorneys fees as a measure of the damages for the
wrongful taking of plaintiff's car by defendant. The
Supreme Court reversal of such a holding in a claim
and delivery case may well be proper, but that is no
precedent to deprive our plaintiff from recovery of
deposition expenses, attorneys fees and court costs
under a written agreement which bound Hartford
to pay ,all loss, cost, damage and expense incurred
by the Title Company.
In, Patterson v. Rinard, 81 111 App 80, it was
held that the obligees of an injunction bond could
recover for the use of their attorneys for attorneys
fees, since attorneys fees are "damages".
The case of Employers' Indemnity Corporation
v. Southwest Nat. Bank, Texas, 299 S.W. 676 involved an action on a surety bond which agreed to
save harmless, ... "against all loss, damage, liability~ expense or costs ... " Some $5500.00 was expended on attorneys fees by the obligee and the Court
17
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awarded judgment not only for the original attorneys fees incurred but also for attorneys fees in recovering the attorneys fees. The appellate- court
held that under the bond, attorneys fees were "damage" and "expense".
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Swaner
v. Union Mortgage Co. 105 Pac. (2d) 342, 99 Utah
298 held that the word "damage" in conjunction with
the defendant's failure to release a mortgage included attorneys fees. The statute at issue, Sec. 783-8, R.S.U .. 1933 authorized an award of "the costs
of suit and all damages resulting from such a failure''. A careful analysis of the earlier holdings of
your Court and of other states was made and then
the opinion stated, "We believe that 'all damages'
includes the damage one incurs when compelled to
employ an attorney to bring legal action to procure a release of the mortgage." We note that the
bond in our present case is much broader as it
reads, "all loss, cost, damage, and expense".
In another Utah case the word "expenses" was
held to include attorneys fees. This was the construction placed by your Court in Foreman v Foreman, 176 Pac (2d)_ 144, 111 Utah 72, on Sect.1045-11, U.C . A. 1943 relating to "costs and expenses"
in contempt proceedings. Other cases can be cited
to further fortify our position that the language·
of the present bond requiring payment of all loss,
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cost, damage and expense includes necessarily the
attorneys fees and court costs expended in defending the insured n1ortgage3 against the lien claimants; particularly when the bond and the prime contract both contain specific promises that they shall
keep each lot or building-site free and clear of labor and material liens.''
This, a law case for brea~h of contract and
the trial court's findings are supported by adequate, competent and material evidence. In this
case all basic facts were stipulated and the defendant bonding company has never, and does not now,
contend that the Title Company has in any manner
breached its obligations under the bond or any other
agreement. The reliance of the Title Company upon
the bond as a condition precedent to the writing of
the A.T.A. policies is undisputed in the evidence.
The well established and oft repeated rule in
Utah is that in a law case, such as the present one,
where there is substantial, competent evidence to
support the findings of the trial court, those findings will not be disturbed: Knudsen Music v. Masterson 121 Ut. 252, 240 Pac. (2d) 973. Also, -that
the plaintiff, having prevailed in the trial Court, is.
entitled to the benefit of having the evidence viewed
in the light most favorable to him, together with
every inference and intendment fairly and reasonably arising therefrom, McCollum v. Collier, 121
Ut. 311, 241 Pac. (2d) 468.
19
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POINT II
THE BREACH OF THE CONTRACT BY FELT OR
ANY OTHER PARTY, IF ANY, DOES NOT BAR RECOVERY BY PACIFIC COAST TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY.
POINT III
THE PARTIES TO THE PRIMARY CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT AND THE CONTRACT BOND COMPROMISED AND SETTLED ANY AND ALL PRIOR
CLAIMED CONTRAC·T BREACHES BY THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMEN'T OF FEBRUARY 16, 1951.

These two points should be considered together
because appellant bonding company places great
stress on a theory that a breach by one party binds
all others. Hartford has received its premium and
now seeks to escape its liability to the several obligations on the bond by asserting a breach of contract by one or more of them. Once again, we note
that absolutely no breach of any contract is asserted
against the Title Company.
The project involved over $1,000,000.00 in
mortgage loans and required a rapid construction
schedule by the contractor Cassady to complete within the 180 days as agreed upon by it and guaranteed
by Hartford. When problems arose in the last five
months or so of 1950, the interested parties conferred. Felt, Cassady & Prudential were the parties
to the construction contract and the financing program. The asserted delay supposedly caused by Felt
failing to sell the lots to Veterans as soon as they
20
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hoped and other minor items, as well as the slowness
of finances due to the reluctance of eligible Veterans to undertake the purchase of new, but yet unbuilt, homes in the face of the Korean situation, the
inability of Prudential to disburse money until qualified Veteran mortgages had been approved and
recorded, and all other complaints, including increases in costs for materials, were compromised.
This was done by the Supplemental Agreement of
February 16, 1951 (Exh. PR-6) referred to in the
statement of facts. No material, alleged breaches of
any type can be shown to have occurred by either
Felt or Prudential after such date.
Each of those two litigants, Felt & Prudential
are filing briefs as to their respective positions and
we therefore will not attempt to duplicate such matters. Suffice it to say that there is no evidence
of the substantial or material asserted breach whic~
had not been either justified by the evidence or compromised by the February 16, 1951 Supplemental
Agreement, accede·d to by Hartford.
If there were any alleged breaches by Felt, no
legal or actual prejudice to Hartford has been s·hown
by the evidence. The general rule as stated in 30.
Am Jur 1115 is that a departure from the contract
will not have the effect of discharging a compensated surety unless it appears that such departure
has resulted in injury, loss or prejudice to the sur~
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ety- there must be a material variance from the
contract.

To take this one step further, we believe that
the Contract Bond now before the Court cannot be
read ·to absolve Hartford from its liability to one
obligee even if another obligee had. failed in its
responsibilities. As such relates to the Title Company, the prime contract obligated Cassady to keep
the premises free·from liens and encumbrances. This
obligation was then guaranteed and repeated in the
Contract Bond by Hartford.
A usual construction bond runs in favor of the
owner as obligee, but here two additional obligees
were added because of the importance of the issues,
Prudential as the "Lender Obligee" and the. Title
Company as the "Title Obligee". In the preamble,
the Bond recites that Cassady as "Princip:al" Hartford as "Surety" are held and firmly bound and
obligated unto the Lender Obligee, the Owner Obligee and the Title Obligee, "as their respective interests may appear as obligees" in the sum of
$'763,000.00. Then each Obligee's relationship was
stated, Title Company being obligated to issue
A.T.A. title policies on each lot wherein a first mort_gage loan was made by Prudential.
The "NOW, THEREFORE" paragraph recited
the obligation of the Principal to keep and main22
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tain each lot and building..:site free and clear of
labor and material liens. Paragraph #3 is the condition under which Hartford seeks an escape from
liability, it reads:
"3. 'T·he SURE'TY shall not be liable
under this Bond to the Obligees, and either
of them, unless the Obligees, or either of them,
shall mal\:e payment to the PRINCIPAL in
reasonable compliance with the terms of said
contract as to payments, and each shall perform all other obligations to be performed by
each Obligee under said contract at the time
and in the manner therein set forth."
Please note that it refers to the prime contract
only between Felt and Cassidy which was dated July
19, 1950. The Title Company was not a party to
said contract and hence had no obligations under it.
Prudential was not a party to said contract and
hence had no obligations to perform under· it.
No evidence is in the record from which it
could be inferred that the Title Company wa~ ever
considered obligated to pay the moneys or perform
the obligations of Felt to Cassady under said contract. Thus the matter of defense raised by the bonding company was never in the contemplation of the
parties and was impossible of performance by the
'Title Company. Though Prudential is not a party
to the prime contract yet it did undertake separately
to loan moneys to qualified Veteran borrowers upon
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the security of first lien mortgages, but nothing
could be inferred whereby the Title Company might
be construed to be liable to make those mortgage
loans.
An ambiguous escape clause is the most that
can be said for Hartford's defense and appeal. Certainly the primary covenants and obligations of the
bond are clear.
The background of the issuance of the bond,
to-wit, that the Title Company would not insure the
mortgages as first liens, against the possibility of
materialmen's liens unless it was fully indemnified
by the bond, is likewise uncontested.
It is contrary to the policy of the law to permit a bonding company to escape from its agreed
guaranty of performance by the contractor unless
the terms of the bond giving it an excuse are clear
and unambiguous and unless the breach complained
about is su·bstantial and material. Neither situation
exists here. As between the Title Company and
Hartford, the Bond was prepared only by Hartford
and the language used therein is Hartford's language, and must be construed most strongly against
it.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT IS A COMPENSATED SURETY AND
THE CONTRA'C'T BOND MUST BE CONSTRUED MOST
STRONGLY AGAINST THE SURETY .

. On the face of the Bond a premium of $7,630.24
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00 is recited and acknowledged. Hartford therefore
stands not as a mere voluntary friend who has
guaranteed performance of a contract, but as a
compensated, -corporate surety engaged in the business of guaranteeing contractual performance. The
contract of such a compensated surety is construed
most strongly against it; see 30 Am. Jur. 1112.

Some rules for construing these surety bonds
are set out in two Utah cases: H. M. Walker Realty
Co, v. Americ.an Surety ~Co. 60 Ut. 435, 211 Pac. 998
and Delux.e Glass Co. v. Martin, 116 Ut 114, 208
Pac. ( 2d) 1127. In the Walker· case the Court held
(p. 1010) that as to a surety who makes insurance a
business, doubtful provisions of a contract are construed in favor of the insured. The Court also repeated the rule that recourse may be had to the
intent of the parties and the existing conditions for
construing a nagreement of this type.
Tl1e DeLuxe Glass case further expended the
rules of construction. The construction contract and
the surety bond are to be construed together. We
feel certain that this rule applied to the present
case will reflect only duties between Felt and Cassady and will not enable Hartford to run away from
its guaranty of such performance after those two
parties in February of 1951 compromised their differ-ences by the Supplemental Agreement, nor infer
25
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uncontracted obligations on Title Company or Prudential.
Little has been said in this brief about the basic
cause of the debacle, to-wit, Cassady's failure to
build the 100 houses within 180 days or the extended period, or to ever complete them in conformance
with its contract so as to entitle the mortgages thereon to approval by the U. S. Veteran's Administration. As appellant, Hartford admits such, but en1phasis seems to be shifted to minor, technical, claimed infractions on the part of Felt and Prudential.
It was Hartford which trusted Cassady to build the
100 houses according to the V. A. requirements and
within the time specified. It took a fee and it
gam·bled and guaranteed that Cassady would perform. Felt, Prudential and Title Company did not
assume that risk. Rather, they relied upon Hartford's performance bond, not upon Cassady.
Hartford had ample opportunity to protect itself prior to writing the bond. It had access to financial statements, investigations, indemnifications
by others and the multiple devices at a compensated
surety's disposal.. Mter taking all steps and precautions deeme·d necessary, and a very substantial
fee, Hartford then underwrote Cassady's performance in the manner and time specified by the July
19, 1950 contract. Then, and only then, did this
Title Obligee undertake to insure the 1nortgages as
26
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and when they were executed and recorded.
The trial Court found in part, Finding 6 and
7, (R. Pac. 18) :
"6. That the defendant as surety executed and delivered said Contract Bond to induce the plaintiff to insure the individual
n1ortgages, that were then about to be executed on the said one hundred lots and dwelling
houses, as first liens thereon "\vithout any exception for the possible liens of materialmen,
laborers or subcontractors, and to induce
plaintiff to issue one hundred A.T.A. title
insurance policies in favor of Prudential Sav~
ings and Loan Association showing the several mortgages as first liens on the respective
lots.
7. That in reliance upon said Contract
Bond and upon the financial responsibility of
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY as the Surety therein, the
plaintiff did in fact issue A.T.A. policies of
title insurance on each and all of the said one
hundred lots arid dwelling houses in Morningside Heights Subdivisions as and when Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association
completed a mortgage loan on each of said
lots and plaintiff did show such mortgage as
a first lien upon the several lots without any
exception for possible materialmen's, laborers', or subcontractors' liens against the property.''
Under the section of American Juris prudence,
Vol. 9, P. 58, dealing with construction contracts
and Bonds we find that contractor's bonds such as
this,." ... will be construed most strongly against a
compensated surety and in favor of obligee or bene27
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ficiaries under the bond." And at 12 Am. Jur. 795
we read:
"§ 252. Interpretation in Favor of One of
Parties. - Doubtful language in contracts
should be interpreted most strongly against
the party who uses it. A written agreement
should, in case of doubt, be interpreted against the party who has drawn it. Sometimes
the rule is stated to be that where doubt exists as to the interpretation of an instrument
, prepared by one party thereto, upon the faith
of which the other has incurred an obligation,
that interpretation will be adopted which will
be favorable to the latter. It is said that an
instrument uncertain as to its terms is to be
most strongly construed against the party
thereto who causes such uncertainty to exist.
T'hus, the general rule is that a doubtful or
ambiguous contract for the professional services of the attorney who drew it should be construed in favor of the client. The rule that
expressions will be interpreted against the
person using them applies only where, after
the ordinary rules of interpretation have been
applied the agreement is still ambiguous. It is
also said that if other things are equal, an
interpretation most beneficial to the promisee
will be adopted when the terms of an instrument and the relationship of the parties leave
it doubtful whether words are used in an enlarged or a restricted sense. To state the same
proposition conversely, it may be said that
everything is to be taken most strongly
against the party on whom the obligation of
the contract rests. Thus it is said that an offer
and a promise therein contained must be construed most strongly against the offerer."
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POINT V
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE LAW.

The foregoing summary of the agreed and stipulated facts and the disputed evidence averred to
above demonstrate that the trial Court had substantial, competent and material evidence before it upon
which to make the findings of fact. The only direct
attack upon the Title Company's judgment was upon
the theory that the damages (stipulated as to
amount) were admitted but not compensable. We
have fully answered that in our argument on Point
I. The collateral attacks by Hartford generally on
all of the other legal matters have likewise been
answered above.
The Trial Court heard the evidence, saw the
witnesses, listened to the arguments of counsel and
then rendered judgment in favor of the Title Company. No sound or justiciable premise has been advanced to over-throw this judgment. The burden is
clearly upon Appellant, Hartford, to show clear and
consistent grounds before a reversal will be granted.
We urge thlat the findings and judgment of the
Trial Court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitte·d,
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON
HARRY D. PUGSLEY
Attorneys for Respondent
Pacific Coast Title Insurance
7·21 Cont'l Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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